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I. INTRODUCTION
The Caribbean island of Puerto Rico is facing one of the great-
est financial crises of our time, where the island is beyond the
point of bankruptcy after accumulating $72 billion in debt, more
than its Gross National Product (GNP). The island is home to 3.5
million residents and the homeland of roughly 5 million Puerto
Ricans in the diaspora who are watching intently as the island tries
to prevent its nation’s collapse. The debt is not only unpayable, as
Governor Alejandro Garcı́a Padilla declared in 2015;1 it is also ar-
guably the result of unscrupulous business practices largely on the
part of hedge funds who bought junk-rated municipal bonds at ex-
tremely low prices and then charged excessively high interest
rates.2 Efforts to renegotiate the debt, restructure the debt, or al-
low for a bankruptcy option for Puerto Rico have all proven unsuc-
† Natasha Lycia Ora Bannan is Associate Counsel at LatinoJustice PRLDEF and
President of the National Lawyers Guild. This article is written for, and dedicated to,
el pueblo puertorriqueño, which has withstood over 500 years of colonial rule and contin-
ues to resist.
1 Michael Corkery & Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico’s Governor Says Island’s Debts
Are ‘Not Payable’, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/
business/dealbook/puerto-ricos-governor-says-islands-debts-are-not-payable.html.
2 Ed Morales, How Hedge and Vulture Funds Have Exploited Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis,
NATION (July 21, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/how-hedge-and-vulture-
funds-have-exploited-puerto-ricos-debt-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/RL6J-PN2T].
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cessful thus far, and creditors have shown no interest in engaging
in debt talks. To the contrary, when Puerto Rico attempted to pass
a domestic version of bankruptcy protection in 2014,3 many hedge
fund creditors sued immediately to prevent enactment of the law.
The matter is currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.4
Much debate has been generated about the legitimacy of the
debt and the brutal and devastating impact it is having on the peo-
ple of Puerto Rico, who are being forced to repay it in the form of
drastically reduced public services, benefits and employment, as
well as increased taxes. The debt is odious in effect and impact,
and possibly in origin. It is important to note, however, that while
the traditional context of odious debt looks at the odious nature of
the debt itself,5 this article discusses the odious nature of the lend-
ing by creditors to a democratically elected government within the
unique political context of colonialism.
The doctrine of odious debt argues that debt accumulated by
an odious regime that burdens, rather than benefits, the people of
that nation should not be repaid.6 An emerging trend in the doc-
trine of odious debt is derived from the realm of transitional jus-
tice, where one sovereign (usually in the form of a dictator or
repressive ruler) has transferred power to another (signaling a po-
litical shift in governance and ideology), and debt repudiation
would promote the goals of that transition.7 That context, which
has been the subject of much discussion and debate, will not be
resurrected here. Rather, I argue that the nuanced context of Pu-
erto Rico’s political status is relevant to an analysis of whether equi-
3 Ley para el Cumplimiento con las Deudas y para la Recuperación de las
Corporaciones Públicas de Puerto Rico [Puerto Rico Public Corporations Debt En-
forcement and Recovery Act], 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71. See also The Facts About Puerto
Rico’s Public Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, GOV’T DEV. BANK FOR P.R.,
http://www.bgfpr.com/documents/FactsAboutDebtEnforcementAndRecovery
Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HE9-PELM].
4 The two main cases involving dozens of hedge funds, Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cali-
fornia Tax-Free Trust and Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, have been con-
solidated before the U.S. Supreme Court. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico,
85 F. Supp. 3d 577 (D.P.R. 2015) (holding that Puerto Rico was preempted from
enacting its own domestic bankruptcy code that would allow it to restructure munici-
pal and agency debt despite its explicit exclusion from federal bankruptcy law under
Chapter 9), aff’d, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom Puerto Rico v.
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015).
5 G. Mitu Gulati et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1203
(2007).
6 Sabine Michalowski & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Ius Cogens, Transitional Justice and
Other Trends of the Debate on Odious Debts: A Response to the World Bank Discussion Paper on
Odious Debts, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 59, 92–93 (2009).
7 Id. at 92.
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table principles allow Puerto Rico to argue the odiousness of its
debt as a defense to repayment under general principles of odious
debt as part of debt relief. While most nations whose debt has been
declared, or argued to be, odious generated such debt through
state-to-state8 borrowing, Puerto Rico’s debt is exclusively gener-
ated by the selling of municipal bonds on the bond market, namely
to private creditors, such as hedge fund investors. Conflicts arising
from contractual disputes, including the selling of state bonds to a
private creditor/investor, are usually governed by domestic law,
which may include equitable considerations or limitations on the
payment of debt. However, such laws rarely, if ever, take into con-
sideration the larger context in which the debt accrued. The doc-
trine of odious debt begs us to consider the circumstances, such as
whether those on whose behalf the debt was incurred ultimately
benefitted from such accrual. In this sense, international law and
principles provide a broader framework from which to approach
debt and debt relief at the nation level.9 It is in this context that
Puerto Rico’s unique political situation as a colony for over 500
years becomes relevant.
A. Overview of Odious Debt
The doctrine of odious debt is one based in principles of eq-
uity, not law. It is an equitable remedy, one that considers factors
of fairness and justness as critical elements that help make up the
“general principles of law of civilized nations.”10 Similar to other
equitable remedies, it is a defense to a binding obligation to repay
money borrowed.11 As such, it acts as a limitation to the general
obligation to pay back debts accrued by one state when borrowing
from other states. As governments transition from old to new, abu-
8 In the international context, “state” is synonymous with “nation,” not a unit of a
nation such as the states of the United States. While Puerto Rico’s territorial status
means it remains a colony of the United States, subject to the jurisdiction and laws of
the United States, I use “state” at times to refer to Puerto Rico as a separate nation
with its own obligations and rights.
9 See generally Alice de Jonge, What Are the Principles of International Law Applicable to
the Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises?, 32 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 129 (2012).
10 Robert Howse, The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law, Discussion
Paper 185, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2007/4, 6 (July 2007),
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20074_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC5D-63VC].
The principle of equity embedded in odious debt constitutes “one of the fundamental
sources of international law stipulated in the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.” Id. at 21.
11 Id. (“The international law obligation to repay debt has never been accepted as
absolute, and has frequently been limited or qualified by a range of equitable consid-
erations, some of which may be regrouped under the concept of ‘odiousness.’”).
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sive to democratic, or governing in war-time to post-conflict socie-
ties, they seek to undo the choke hold of debt accumulated
unfairly or unconscionably, which burdens nations seeking pro-
gress or economic stability.12
The principles of odious debt provide a moral foundation for
severing, in whole or in part, the continuity of legal obligations
where the debt in question was contracted and used in ways that
were not beneficial, or were actually harmful, to the interests of the
population. Thus the debt is either adjusted or severed (often in
the context of political transitions) based in part on the notion that
the debt incurred did not benefit, or was even used to repress, the
people of that nation. Interestingly, odious debt first appeared in
practice when the United States refused to assume the debts ac-
quired by Spain when it was ceded sovereignty over Cuba, Puerto
Rico, the Philippines, and other territories in the late nineteenth
century after the Spanish-American War.13 The United States
claimed that the debt Spain was attempting to pass on after trading
colonial rule was not contracted for the benefit of the Cuban peo-
ple, and in fact was hostile to their interests.14 As a result, the
United States bore no obligation to honor it. Although Spain main-
tained the position that the sovereign who gains the benefits of
ruling also bears the burdens of assuming its debts, the United
States eventually prevailed.15
Debt repudiation is not a new concept, although it has gained
traction lately as the international community becomes more at-
tuned to the crushing weight of debt and debt repayment on
poorer nations whose debt only benefits creditor nations and per-
petuates vicious cycles of economic violence on their citizens.16
The concept of odious debt was originally articulated after World
12 See generally Jeff A. King, Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 605, 621–33 (2007) (examining the historical origins of the doctrine of
odious debt).
13 Howse, supra note 10, at 10–11.
14 Id. The American Commissioners who refused to pay Spain’s debt incurred in
Cuba reasoned that “the loans were hostile to the people required to pay them.” Id.
15 Paul B. Stephan, The Institutionalist Implications of an Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 219–20 (2007).
16 See Chris Jochnick, The Legal Case for Debt Repudiation, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE
CROSSROADS: CHALLENGES AND PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING THE THIRD WORLD DEBT CRI-
SIS 132 (Chris Jocknick & Fraser A. Preston eds., 2006); see also Michalowski & Bohos-
lavsky, supra note 6, at 89–90 (“The contemporary legal discussion of odious debts to
some extent reflects the view of campaigners that a doctrine of odious debts should
address broader political and moral concerns. It demonstrates a widely shared convic-
tion that legal remedies are necessary in order to deal with cases in which debt repay-
ment is regarded as morally repugnant.”).
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War I by Alexander Nahum Sack, who divided odious debts into
several categories, including war debts, subjugated or imposed
debts, and regime debts.17 An odious debt described any debt con-
tracted for purposes that do not conform or comply with custom-
ary international law and, in particular, the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.18
Various principles in international law contribute to the for-
mation of the notion of odious debt, all of which are applicable in
the context of Puerto Rico. Strict interpretation and compliance
with traditional contract law and creditor/debtor lending princi-
ples shifts to more equitable considerations under the doctrine of
odious debt. Such considerations include promoting equitable and
fair dealing, protecting human rights, establishing and supporting
democracy and democratic movements, and creating processes for
true civic participation.19 The prominence of consideration of
human rights in debt accumulation and repayment is particularly
salient in the context of Puerto Rico, where the economic crisis has
resulted in a foreclosure and housing crisis, increased crime and
violence, forced migration, and extraordinarily high levels of pov-
erty and unemployment. As a result of the debt owed, millions have
been impacted by austerity measures and cuts to public services.20
Since the end of the 1898 Spanish-American War, there has
been little opportunity to adjudicate claims of odious debt in the
domestic context. Odious debt has not developed much in domes-
17 ALEXANDER NAHUM SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS
DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES [THE EFFECTS OF STATE TRANS-
FORMATIONS ON THEIR PUBLIC DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] (1927); see
also Howse, supra note 10, at 2.
18 Mohammed Bedjaoui (Special Rapporteur of the Int’l Law Comm’n), Ninth Rep.
on the Succession of States in Respect of Matters Other than Treaties, ¶ 129, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/301 and Add.1 (Apr. 13 and 20, 1977).
19 Howse, supra note 10, at 4 (“Formal concepts of sovereignty and statehood have
been influential and so have notions of political justice and accountability, as well as
ideas of fair dealing and equity in contractual relations. In recent and contemporary
treatments of odious debt, human rights elements have attained importance . . . .”).
20 Letter from Annette Martı́nez Orabona, Caribbean Inst. Human Rights, and Eva
Prados Rodrı́guez, Gen. Coordinator, Cumbre Social, to Emilio Álvarez Icaza, Exec.
Sec’y, Inter-American Comm’n on Human Rights (Jan. 20, 2016) (request for a the-
matic hearing before the IACHR regarding public debt, fiscal policy, and poverty in
Puerto Rico) (on file with author) [hereinafter Request for Thematic Hearing]; see
also Brief for LatinoJustice PRLDEF et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
3–20, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., No. 15-233 (Jan.
26, 2016), http://latinojustice.org/civil_rights/commonwealth_v_franklin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72R6-CVXZ]; see also Ed Morales, The Roots of Puerto Rico’s Debt Cri-
sis—and Why Austerity Will Not Solve It, NATION (July 8, 2015), http://www.thenation.
com/article/the-roots-of-puerto-ricos-debt-crisis-and-why-austerity-will-not-solve-it/
[https://perma.cc/QAH5-QR3Z].
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tic practice because it is not often asserted as a defense to contract
enforcement.21 However, contract law is grounded in common law,
and as such evolves with the facts, law, and equitable principles
presented in each case; therefore, odious debt and other equitable
remedy doctrines develop over time.22 Inconsistent or even inade-
quate state practice is neither a reason to disregard the doctrine or
discourage its assertion, nor should obligations deemed odious
continue to be enforced in domestic fora.23 Normative considera-
tions and state practice recognize that debt in a wide variety of le-
gal and political contexts has led to determinations of
odiousness.24 As such, strict conditions, terms, or scenarios are not
necessary to argue for the non-enforcement of debt obligations.
B. Economic Crisis and Human Rights Violations in Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico is spending more on debt service than on educa-
tion, health, or security.25 The weight of its crushing $72 billion
debt has resulted in closing over 150 schools,26 increasing taxes,27
21 Cf. Stephan, supra note 15, at 213 (“The United States originated the concept of
odious debt over a century ago, but since World War II, it has regularly upheld the
position of creditors in negotiations with defaulting sovereign debtors. At present no
treaty or legislation specifically provides for this defense, and no domestic court in
any country or any modern arbitral tribunal has embraced it.”).
22 In the international human rights context, a similar notion is that of customary
international law, which is a body of law made by the accumulation of decisions,
norms, and principles in domestic, regional, and international fora. It includes the
general and consistent practices of states and a sense of legal obligation that binds
them to such decisions and practices. Admittedly, it is still debated whether odious
debt is considered part of customary international law, in part because it is a remedy
at equity, not at law, and because there is not a consistent state practice of successor
states assuming the debt of previous regimes. However, that does not necessarily make
debt less odious. See, e.g., Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 6, at 65; Emily F.
Mancina, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resurrecting the Odious Debt Doctrine in
International Law, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1239, 1247–53 (2004).
23 See Howse, supra note 10, at 8 (“It would be mistaken to invoke cases where the
debt was arguably odious but the outcome was adjustment not elimination of obliga-
tions to show that state practice does not support the existence of an odious debt
concept as customary international law.”).
24 The United States has historically recognized debt repudiation by various states
outside the traditional scope of despotic dictatorships. See Sara Ludington et al., Ap-
plied Legal History: Demystifying the Doctrine of Odious Debt, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
247, 248–49 (2010).
25 Jennifer Wolff, The Human Cost of Puerto Rico’s Limbo, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND.: VOICES
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/human-cost-puerto-
rico-s-limbo [https://perma.cc/GEN6-WNKE].
26 Danica Coto, Puerto Rico Struggling to Maintain Its Schools Amid Cutbacks, Exodus,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 17, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/
2015/05/16/puerto-rico-closes-dozens-schools-economic-woes-deepen/443kazMI7Vr
8EdvpN2NGYN/story.html [https://perma.cc/X84P-LNF2].
27 Danica Coto, Misery Deepens for Those in Puerto Rico Who Can’t Leave, ASSOCIATED
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laying off public sector workers,28 proposing to reduce the mini-
mum wage,29 a growing shortage of medical specialists due to emi-
gration of 3,000 doctors in a five-year period,30 forcing migration
to the United States,31 increasing unemployment and underem-
ployment,32 separating families,33 and increasing food insecurity.34
Lack of any vehicle to renegotiate the debt will limit the prospects
of altering Puerto Rico’s bleak economic future and will further
the mass exodus of residents from the island.35
In a hearing before the United States Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, the Governor of Puerto Rico admitted the extent of
PRESS (Aug. 3, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a4622a3466db460aa33
b203830882756/misery-deepens-those-puerto-rico-who-cant-leave [https://perma.cc/
C37P-K5GA].
28 Greg Allen, As Puerto Rican Economy Lags, Some Question Cuts, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/26/140802828/as-puerto-rican-econ-
omy-lags-some-question-cuts [https://perma.cc/2C83-3A54].
29 ANNE O. KRUEGER ET AL., PUERTO RICO—A WAY FORWARD, GOV’T DEV. BANK FOR
P.R. (June 29, 2015), http://www.bgfpr.com/documents/puertoricoawayforward.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VEM3-88K6].
30 Lizette Alvarez & Abby Goodnough, Puerto Ricans Brace for Crisis in Health Care,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/03/us/health-provid-
ers-brace-for-more-cuts-to-medicare-in-puerto-rico.html.
31 See, e.g., Jaison R. Abel & Richard Deitz, Population Lost: Puerto Rico’s Troubling
Out-Migration, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.: LIBERTY ST. ECON. BLOG (Apr. 13, 2015),
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2015/04/population-lost-puerto-ricos-
troubling-out-migration.html [https://perma.cc/EY43-FSLS]; Jaison R. Abel & Rich-
ard Deitz, The Causes and Consequences of Puerto Rico’s Declining Population, 20 CURRENT
ISSUES ECON. & FINANCE, no. 4, 2014, at 1–8, https://www.newyorkfed.org/mediali-
brary/media/research/current_issues/ci20-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/53UJ-YY2Z].
32 See DEPARTAMENTO DEL TRABAJO Y RECURSOS HUMANOS NEGOCIADO DE ESTADÍSTI-
CAS DEL TRABAJO, EMPLEO Y DESEMPLEO EN PUERTO RICO: PROMEDIO AÑO NATURAL
2014 [EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN PUERTO RICO] 6–7, http://
www.estadisticas.gobierno.pr/iepr/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=UNPbf00R8Y4%3D
&tabid=186 [https://perma.cc/4R28-GUQA]; see also Ed Morales, Puerto Rico in Crisis:
Weighed Down by $73bn Debt as Unemployment Hits 14%, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/28/puerto-rico-debt-unemployment
[https://perma.cc/B5KE-EM5S].
33 See Brief for LatinoJustice PRLDEF et al., supra note 20, at 3–20; Jens Manuel
Krogstad, Puerto Ricans Leave in Record Numbers for Mainland U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/14/puerto-ricans-
leave-in-record-numbers-for-mainland-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/JT98-N5AQ].
34 See Senate of Puerto Rico, Final Report: Senate Resolution No. 237, Committee on
Civil Rights, Citizen Participation and Social Economy, 17th Legislative Assembly - 5th
Regular Session (Apr. 9, 2015) (on file with author); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-13-260, PUERTO RICO: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ISLAND’S MARITIME TRADE
AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF MODIFYING THE JONES ACT 17 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/660/653046.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8SG-AVKM]; see also Expuesto Puerto Rico a
Una Crisis Alimentaria, EL NUEVO DIA (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.elnuevodia.com/
negocios/consumo/nota/expuestopuertoricoaunacrisisalimentaria-1717099/
[https://perma.cc/RGH7-B2JJ].
35 Wolff, supra note 25.
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the austerity measures his administration has taken in order to ap-
pease creditors:
In the three years of my Administration alone we have, inter
alia, reformed our largest pension fund from a defined benefit
plan to a defined contribution plan, including for current em-
ployees; froze[n] collective bargaining agreements, revenues
measures that impacted the sales tax, the petroleum products
tax and water rates; reduced government employment as a share
of the population to an average lower than in the states though
[sic] attrition and hiring freezes; and reduced expenses by
twenty percent, the lowest spending level in a decade. The peo-
ple of Puerto Rico have been the sole bearers of these
burdens.36
The human impact is both visible (e.g., professionals and stu-
dents leaving the island to seek employment in the United States)37
and invisible (e.g., the elderly and ill lying in cots in hospital hall-
ways for days at a time, waiting for a room to become free).38 There
are many potential sources of blame for Puerto Rico’s current debt
crisis: hedge funds engaged in risky, and perhaps negligent, finan-
cial ventures;39 the government mismanaged funds40 and has
36 Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Problems: Examining the Source and Exploring the Solution: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1 (2015) (statement of Hon. Alejandro
J. Garcı́a, Governor of Puerto Rico), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Garcia-Padilla%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ98-CSXQ].
37 D’vera Cohn, Eileen Patten & Mark Hugo Lopez, Puerto Rican Population Declines
on Island, Grows on U.S. Mainland, PEW HISPANIC CTR. (Aug. 11, 2014), http://
www.pewhispanic.org/2014/08/11/puerto-rican-population-declines-on-island-grows-
on-u-s-mainland/ [https://perma.cc/79M6-6KS6]; see also Press Release, Instituto de
Estadı́sticas de Puerto Rico, La Emigración Neta Alcanza Su Punto Más Alto en la
Ultima Década [Net Emigration Reaches Its Highest Point in the Last Decade] (Sept.
17, 2015), http://www.estadisticas.gobierno.pr/iepr/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=KMY
2LP3VLPw%3D&tabid=39&mid=590 [https://perma.cc/45LK-54YS] (P.R.); ALBERTO
L. VELÁZQUEZ-ESTRADA, INSTITUTO DE ESTADÍSTICAS DE PUERTO RICO, PERFIL DEL
MIGRANTE 2013 [2013 MIGRANT PROFILE] (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.estadisticas.
gobierno.pr/iepr/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=U_goumCYemA%3D&tabid=165 [https:/
/perma.cc/2HHQ-D5VA] (P.R.).
38 Alvarez & Goodnough, supra note 30; Kate Kilpatrick, Patients, Doctors Say Puerto
Rico’s Health System in Critical Condition, AL JAZEERA AM. (Sept. 4, 2015), http://
america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/4/puerto-ricos-health-system-in-critical-con-
dition.html [https://perma.cc/8ABU-W79R].
39 Jonathan Mahler & Nicholas Confessore, Inside the Billion-Dollar Battle for Puerto
Rico’s Future, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/us/
politics/puerto-rico-money-debt.html.
40 D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUERTO RICO’S CURRENT FISCAL
CHALLENGES 1–4 (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44095.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7KP4-FUDT] (discussing role of Puerto Rican public utility agen-
cies in incurring the majority of the debt).
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avoided disclosing its financial capacity to repay its debt;41 and anti-
quated federal maritime laws restrict maritime transport of cargo
between the United States and Puerto Rico to U.S.-flagged ships.42
Yet equally prevalent are proposed solutions to handle the cri-
sis in the face of repetitive deadlines where the government is con-
sistently expected to fail to meet its repayment obligations.43
Coalitions have formed to demand congressional action, advocat-
ing for modifications to the federal Bankruptcy Code in order to
allow Puerto Rico to declare Chapter 9 bankruptcy,44 which would
permit the island’s municipalities and public agencies to restruc-
ture its debt. Prominent progressive leaders and institutions in the
United States have voiced public calls to hedge funds to reduce the
debt, as well as to the Treasury Department to pressure reluctant
creditors to engage in debt renegotiations.45
Additional proposals that primarily involve federal action in-
clude modifying the Jones Act, the 1920 law that includes the Cab-
otage Law,46 which is applied in its entirety to Puerto Rico (and not
other affected states or jurisdictions), resulting in extremely high
shipping costs to the island; eliminating disparities in healthcare
41 COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND OPERATING DATA
REPORT 15–16 (2014), http://www.gdb-pur.com/documents/CommonwealthReport-
October302014.pdf [https://perma.cc/EP8K-SK8V].
42 Senate of Puerto Rico, supra note 34 (discussing Senate resolution to fund a
study examining the impact of the Cabotage and maritime laws on the Puerto Rican
economy). Cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 34.
43 Governor Alejandro Garcı́a Padilla has put forward a five-year debt restructur-
ing and economic recovery plan. WORKING GRP. FOR THE FISCAL & ECON. RECOVERY OF
PUERTO RICO PURSUANT TO EXEC. ORDER 2015-022, PUERTO RICO FISCAL AND ECO-
NOMIC GROWTH PLAN (Sept. 9, 2015), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
2388398/puerto-ricos-debt-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/943D-GEXV].
44 Puerto Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity Act of 2015, H.R. 870, 114th Cong. (2015).
For more on coalition advocacy efforts, see HISPANIC FED’N, NATIONAL DAY OF ACTION
FOR PUERTO RICO TOOLKIT (2015) http://www.hispanicfederation.org/images/pdf/
prtoolkit2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QGD-4PTX]; HECTOR CORDERO-GUZMAN ET
AL., HISPANIC FED’N, PUERTO RICO’S ECONOMIC CRISIS: OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR ACTION (Oct. 2015), http://www.hispanicfederation.org/images/pdf/
hfprpolicy2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2BC-N359].
45 See Martin Z. Braun, NYC Pension Urges Hedge Funds to Ease Puerto Rico Crisis,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
11-13/nyc-pension-urges-hedge-funds-to-ease-puerto-rico-debt-crisis [https://
perma.cc/2X93-7F46]; Senator Elizabeth Warren: Treasury Should Step Up to Help Families
in Puerto Rico, WARREN.SENATE.GOV (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.warren.senate.gov/
?p=video&id=994 [https://perma.cc/3K2R-4HAU].
46 Merchant Marine (Jones) Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988 (codified
as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 55102). See Rory Carroll, U.S. Shippers Push Back in Battle
over Puerto Rico Import Costs, REUTERS (July 9, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-puertorico-shipping-idUSKCN0PJ2TF20150709 [https://perma.cc/L4A4-
JK24].
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funding and reimbursements to the island under Medicaid and
Medicare;47 and extending federal tax credits for working families
and parents to Puerto Rico.48 Investors and those in the financial
industry have simply advocated for increased austerity measures49
like the ones already adopted, which are crippling the island.
However, none of the options listed would necessarily relieve
the unbearable economic and social burden on the people of Pu-
erto Rico. The only way to lift this burden is if the government was
not required to repay decades of accumulated debt and instead
could focus on addressing its underlying economic crisis, which is a
product of its political status as a colony.50 The debt must not only
be declared unpayable,51 but also immoral and perhaps illegal as
well. This should be done to prevent a continuous injustice upon
the people who were forced to bear exorbitantly-priced goods and
diminished public services while their nation became indebted and
who are now asked to assume the burden of that debt in the form
of austerity.
II. UNPACKING THE ACCUMULATION OF DEBT FOR THE “BENEFIT
OF THE PEOPLE”
The benefits incurred by debt accumulation, if any, are a pri-
mary consideration of whether debt relief should be granted.52
Debt repayment can become illegitimate when it prevents a state
47 Maria Levis, The Price of Inequality for Puerto Rico, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Dec. 29,
2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/12/29/the-price-of-inequality-for-puerto-
rico [https://perma.cc/KML7-HCLH]; ANNIE L. MACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R44275, PUERTO RICO AND HEALTH CARE FINANCE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
(Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44275.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U4R3-G96M]; Danica Coto, NY Governor, NYC Mayor Join Puerto Rico Health Care Rally,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 5, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/3e6dfaa60b884292
a11bea80374728af/ny-governor-nyc-mayor-join-puerto-rico-health-care [https://
perma.cc/AC8W-49PS].
48 Earned Income Tax Credit Equity Puerto Rico Act of 2015, H.R. 3553, 114th
Cong. (2015).
49 KRUEGER ET AL., supra note 29.
50 See RAFAEL BERNABE, PUERTO RICO: CRISIS Y ALTERNATIVAS (2014) for a discus-
sion of the economic, social, political, and environmental consequences arising from
Puerto Rico’s political status.
51 Governor Padilla has already characterized the debt as unpayable. Corkery &
Williams Walsh, supra note 1.
52 Gulati et al., supra note 5, at 1203, 1212–13. For a preview of the argument that
debt is unenforceable under agency law, see Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious
Debts or Odious Regimes?, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 92 (2007) (“If the citizens of a
country are viewed as the principal, the leaders as the agent, and creditors as the third
party,” then “[d]ebts incurred without consent by or benefit to a country’s citizens,
. . . and to a creditor who is aware of these facts, should deemed unenforceable.”).
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from fulfilling its human rights obligations.53
Equitable defenses beyond odious debt, such as laches and
“unclean hands” (a doctrine very similar to odious debt) have long
been applied in contract law. International forums and tribunals
have also cited such defenses to determine the limitations and fair
reach of debt that has been acquired under questionable circum-
stances.54 As Robert Howse points out, it is not only the evolution
of domestic jurisprudence and interpretation of contract princi-
ples that apply to interpretation of a state’s obligations, but inter-
national law as well. In particular, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties “requires that the obligations in any one agree-
ment be read in light of other binding agreements . . . .”55 State
responsibility to abide by international law includes human rights
obligations both explicitly assumed by the signing and ratification
of bilateral or multilateral treaties,56 or less explicitly assumed yet
still binding, such as customary international law.
The United States, and Puerto Rico as a political entity of the
United States, is obligated to affirmatively ensure that the rights
enshrined in the contracts and treaties it has signed are not jeop-
ardized, compromised, or superseded by any contracts signed sub-
sequently.57 In fact, contractual obligations cannot supersede a
state’s human rights responsibilities. Similarly, the government
may not interfere with, undermine, or violate any of the protected
53 Cephas Lumina (Special Rapporteur on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other
Related Int’l Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human
Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), Rep. on Guiding Principles
on Foreign Debt and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/23, ¶¶ 3–4, 6–7 (Apr. 10,
2012) (“States’ human rights obligations are clearly relevant in the context of their
external debt arrangements.”).
54 Howse, supra note 10, at 6 (“Equitable limits to contractual obligations . . . have
included illegality, fraud, fundamentally changed circumstances, knowledge that an
agent is not properly acting on behalf of the contracting principal and duress.”).
55 Id.
56 The United States is a party to several human rights treaties, which have the
same weight as federal law under Article VI of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 2(1), 6(1), 17, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art.
5(e)(iv), opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan.
4, 1969). In addition, the United States has signed, but not ratified, other prominent
human rights treaties. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women arts. 1, 10, 12, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
57 U.S. CONST. art. VI; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signa-
ture May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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rights.58
Puerto Rico’s debt has been accumulating over the last several
decades, while the nation has been in a recession for at least the
past ten years59 and public services have been cut steadily for the
past six years.60 There is a constant threat of continued cuts to pub-
lic services and a government shutdown if the island is forced to
pay in full every time payment becomes due.61 Meanwhile, local
businesses are suffering the brutal impact of lost revenue, talent,
and clientele.62 Austerity measures like the ones proposed and im-
plemented in Puerto Rico63 are not only disastrous for the people
of Puerto Rico, but they seriously undermine and even violate the
economic and social rights contemplated by the United Nations
Charter and enshrined in international human rights law.64 Auster-
ity measures imposed under the pretext of fiscal stability actually
create harmful long-term fiscal policy and ultimately burden those
affected more, creating no benefits for the citizenry in either the
accumulation of debt or its repayment.
As a result of the crushing weight of debt repayment, human
rights violations are occurring on the island.65 The government is
not using increased tax revenue to fund necessary services and pro-
grams, but rather to pay back creditors.66 The traditional context
of odious debt recognizes the immorality of a debt that was ac-
crued to suppress, repress, or oppress a people, and which often
58 The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural
Rights, Fifth Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990); see Jernej Letnar Cernic, State Obliga-
tions Concerning Socio-Economic Rights in Times of the European Financial Crisis, 11 B.Y.U.
INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 125, 128, 131–36 (2015).
59 Allen, supra note 28.
60 Id.; Coto, supra note 26; Alvarez & Goodnough, supra note 30.
61 Edward Krudy, Puerto Rico Officials Warn Government Shutdown Imminent, REUTERS
(Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-puertorico-idUSKBN0ND2P6
20150423 [https://perma.cc/PDY7-LXZB].
62 Coto, supra note 27.
63 See Lauren Carasik, Gutting Schools Won’t Solve Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis, AL JAZEERA
AM. (Aug. 11, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/8/gutting-
schools-wont-solve-puerto-ricos-debt-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/SD7R-9ADG].
64 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) ICESCR, supra note 56; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
65 See Request for Thematic Hearing, supra note 20; see also Public Affairs Secretary
Testifies on Puerto Rico Crisis, CARIBBEAN BUS. (Apr. 4, 2016), http://cb.pr/puerto-rico-
to-testify-on-fiscal-crisis-before-human-rights-forum/ [https://perma.cc/JP6N-4U7W].
66 Suzanne Gamboa, Puerto Rico Makes Debt Payment; Governor Issues ‘Distress Call’,
NBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/puerto-rico-
makes-debt-payment-governor-issues-distress-call-n472126 [https://perma.cc/5DZA-
7DJZ].
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results in atrocious human rights abuses.67  Those civil and political
rights abuses that occurred because of the loan’s procurement are
recognized as odious.68 The economic and social rights abuses that
occur as a result of loan repayment should be seen as equally odi-
ous. Whether borrowed money is being used to commit human
rights violations, or whether repaying borrowed money is causing
the same, both contribute to the full panorama of human rights
and debt.
III. KNOWINGLY ENGAGED IN RISK
The concept of odious debt forgiveness also takes into account
whether or not the creditor knew or should have known of any
risky circumstances at the time the debt was contracted.69 The
United States was able to repudiate the debt Cuba had accumu-
lated as a Spanish colony by showing that the original “creditors
knew that the pledge of Cuban revenues to secure the loans had
been given in the context of efforts to suppress a struggle for free-
dom from the Spanish rule. Therefore the creditors ‘took their
[sic] obvious chances of their investment on so precarious a
security.’”70
In the context of Puerto Rico’s borrowing of billions of dol-
lars, the considerations are less about whether the creditor knew of
the state’s purported intention for the use of such funds—in this
case keeping their government afloat—and more about the ethical
and responsible nature of lending under the new concept of “odi-
ous lending,” a proposed expansion of odious debt doctrine.71
Guidelines have long established ethical and socially responsible
67 Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the Externalities of a
Functional Odious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 109, 146–47 (2008).
68 David C. Gray, Devilry, Complicity, and Greed: Transitional Justice and Odious Debt,
70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 140 (2007).
69 Howse, supra note 10, at 17 (“Short of actual subjective knowledge, the notion
that the lender ought to have known the intent of the debtor raises the issue of the
nature and extent of the burden imposed on creditors to take positive steps to inform
themselves of the purposes of the loan, and to assess the credibility of assertions of
borrower state officials in that respect . . . [including] whether an agent (the debtor
State) is exceeding its authority.”); Bolton & Skeel, supra note 52, at 92–93 (“[T]he
domestic-litigation strategy might be limited still more by the need to show that the
lender knew or should have known the debt was wrongfully incurred.”).
70 Howse, supra note 10, at 10–11.
71 See Ochoa, supra note 67, at 158; STEPHEN MANDEL, NEW ECON. FOUND., ODIOUS
LENDING DEBT RELIEF AS IF MORALS MATTERED 5, http://www.dette2000.org/data/
File/Odiouslendingfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/59RY-BLE6] [hereinafter ODIOUS
LENDING].
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investments and lending practices by financial institutions.72 These
guidelines perform a range of functions, such as ensuring the use
of fair interest rates and penalties; providing transparency in trans-
actions (such as fees and charges); recognizing instances where a
dramatic change in circumstances may prohibit a borrower from
being able to repay the loan (in part or in its entirety); ensuring
that loan contraction procedures and repayment plans protect
human rights; ensuring that loans comply with social, labor, and
environmental standards (both in borrowing and the terms of re-
payment); and promoting orderly debt restructuring or repayment
processes that provide incentives for responsible lending and fair
burden-sharing.73
Many creditors—particularly hedge funds known as “vulture
funds,” who buy distressed debt at extraordinarily high rates—
knowingly engaged in precarious financial investments in Puerto
Rico, even during the economic recession and after Puerto Rico’s
credit rating was downgraded.74 In fact, they charged higher inter-
est rates because of that risk in order to protect themselves from a
default.75 A report by staff for a congressional committee pointed
out that hedge funds knowingly engaged in high-risk transactions
and sought to profit from it at exorbitant and unethical rates. As
the report explains, the hedge funds:
had no excuse  for  not  knowing  the  risks  of  buying  Puerto
Rico municipal bonds.  Rather than absorbing the occasional in-
vestment losses that are expected as a matter of course when
assessments are wrong, even by the most successful investing
firms, these hedge funds are now working to pad their profits by
cutting off relief options for families in the territory.76
72 ODIOUS LENDING, supra note 71, at 21–24; see also PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
INVESTMENT INITIATIVE, RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT AND HEDGE FUNDS: A DISCUSSION PA-
PER (2012), http://www.unpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2012.11RIandHF.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PTU7-MHVD].
73 PRIVILEGE HAANGÁNDU, JUBILEE USA NETWORK, THE RESPONSIBLE LENDING AND
BORROWING IMPERATIVE: ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF POVERTY 8 (Mar. 2012),
http://www.jubileeusa.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Resources/2012_Jubi-
lee_USA_Files/RLB_New_Formatting_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/86G4-RLND].
74 See, e.g., Joel Cintrón Arbasetti, Vulture Funds Have Puerto Rico Cornered, CENTRO
DE PERIODISMO INVESTIGATIVO (Apr. 9, 2015), http://periodismoinvestigativo.com/
2015/04/vulture-funds-have-puerto-rico-cornered/ [https://perma.cc/KB4N-T4SB];
Morales, supra note 2.
75 Mahler & Confessore, supra note 39; David Dayen, Don’t Reward the Greedy Vulture
Funds Who Recklessly Invested in Puerto Rico, NEW REPUBLIC (July 1, 2015), https://
newrepublic.com/article/122218/dont-reward-vulture-funds-who-recklessly-invested-
puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/PZB2-83Z9].
76 RAUL M. GRIJALVA, PROFIT AT ANY COST: HOW SOME HEDGE FUNDS WIN BY MAK-
ING SURE PUERTO RICO LOSES 1 (2015), http://democrats-naturalresources.
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Puerto Rico’s government and people are now forced to
shoulder the disastrous impact of the public debt, but the problem
is rooted in the perilous behavior of creditors and other private
entities.77 Those creditors, along with other hedge funds, have
largely refused to engage in discussions regarding debt restructur-
ing, much less debt relief.78 In fact, days before Puerto Rico en-
acted its quiebra criolla law on June 28, 2014, which allowed its
municipalities and agencies to access a debt restructuring regime
identical to Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Code, a hedge
fund filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the law and Pu-
erto Rico’s ability to implement its own domestic version of bank-
ruptcy protections.79 Dozens of other hedge funds later joined the
suit against Puerto Rico.80
The notion of “unsustainable debt” as an emerging concept of
odious debt doctrine (under the larger construct of illegitimate
debt81) is instructive here.  Unsustainable debt maintains that a
debt whose repayment (as opposed to accrual) causes governments
house.gov/imo/media/doc/Profit%20at%20Any%20Cost%20Hedge%20
Fund%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLF5-WVLF] (“The risks of these invest-
ments were well known in advance of their sale – indeed, in publicly available docu-
ments, clear warnings were offered to investors that profit was not guaranteed and
that the bonds carried significant potential for investor losses.”).
77 Id. The questionable and unethical behavior of the hedge funds, the primary
creditors, has been detailed at length, including their efforts to take advantage of
Puerto Rico’s precarious financial position. In essence, hedge funds have:
pushed Puerto Rico to take on more debt at extremely generous terms
for creditors. In April 2015, they proposed backstopping the island’s
proposed $3 billion debt issuance, but only if it was made “bulletproof”
in a way that protected creditor interests. They requested “acceleration
rights,” for instance, which would mean that the entire amount would
be due if the government defaulted. They also proposed requiring the
government to hold proceeds from the debt in escrow in case proposed
tax reform was not enacted in advance of the issuance—essentially us-
ing their participation in the debt deal as leverage for securing austerity
measures.
Id. at 3 (quoting Hedge Fund Vultures in Puerto Rico, HEDGE CLIPPERS (July 10, 2015),
http://hedgeclippers.org/hedgepapers-no-17-hedge-fund-billionaires-in-puerto-rico/
[https://perma.cc/J92V-RNBV]); see also Sam Thielman, Puerto Rico Poised to Miss An-
other Debt Deadline as Financial Crisis Rages On, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2015), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/01/puerto-rico-debt-repayment-default-fi-
nancial-crisis [https://perma.cc/WU3K-WGE5] (discussing how one creditor, UBS,
has engaged in financially risky, and perhaps reckless, lending).
78 Editorial Board, Congress Needs to Throw Puerto Rico a Lifeline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/opinion/sunday/congress-needs-to-
throw-puerto-rico-a-lifeline.html.
79 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico, 85 F. Supp. 3d 577 (D.P.R. 2015).
80 Id. at 584–85, nn.1–2.
81 A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and the Odious Debt Doctrine: The Miss-
ing Link in the Debate, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 61 (2007).
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to deprive people of basic needs in order to service the debt should
be declared unpayable and cancelled.82
Where a debt may be legal and used for the benefit of the peo-
ple and in isolation its terms are not overly onerous, it may nev-
ertheless be unpayable because of the overall level of
indebtedness of the country relative to its debt-servicing capac-
ity. The concept of debt sustainability is at present defined very
narrowly by the creditors and has focused almost entirely on a
country’s ability to pay in terms of its export earnings. National
governments, however, have an obligation towards their citizens
to provide their basic needs for clean water, health and educa-
tion and at least not to frustrate their citizens’ attempts to meet
their needs for food, clothing and shelter. The freedom of the
population to pursue the meeting of these needs is a fundamen-
tal human right. If a government can only meet its debt servic-
ing by failing to provide basic health and education services and
by taxing its citizens so that they cannot pay for enough food or
shelter, this violates these human rights. It is therefore essential
that any concept of debt sustainability includes an assessment of
a) what level of taxation is reasonable, and b) what minimum
expenditure is required to enable a government to meet its obli-
gations to its citizens. Only after this obligation is met can funds
be set aside for debt servicing. Debts incompatible with human
rights should be cancelled.83
Creditors argue that the government of Puerto Rico actually
benefitted from the debt by purportedly using the funds to con-
tinue to provide ongoing government services, and thus repudia-
tion of the debt would constitute unjust enrichment. However, the
other equitable considerations that underlie the concept of odious-
ness and make it particularly applicable in the colonial context of
Puerto Rico present a rich defense against such an assertion. To
find unjust enrichment, one party must have been enriched at the
expense of the other.84 There has been no enrichment of colonial
Puerto Rico. There is no credible way to argue that Puerto Rico has
82 For a discussion on the expansion of the odious debt doctrine to include ques-
tioning the legitimacy of current lending practices and the disproportionate and con-
sequential impact on the developing world as an extension of neoliberal economic
policies, see Larry Catá Backer, Odious Debt Wears Two Faces: Systemic Illegitimacy,
Problems, and Opportunities in Traditional Odious Debt Conceptions in Globalized Economic
Regimes, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 19 (2007).
83 ODIOUS LENDING, supra note 71, at 7; see also STEPHEN MANDEL, NEW ECON.
FOUND., DEBT RELIEF AS IF JUSTICE MATTERED: A FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH TO DEBT RELIEF THAT WORKS 2 (2008), http://www.i-r-e.org/docs/a008_a-
comprehensive-approach-to-debt-relief.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JZZ-6AEM] [herein-
after DEBT RELIEF AS IF JUSTICE MATTERED].
84 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011).
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been “enriched” by continuing to indebt itself to the point of ow-
ing more than it is capable of producing and paying. The parties
actually enriched by Puerto Rico’s debt remain its creditors, who by
the same principles of equity may not profit off of their actions,
which both helped place Puerto Rico in debt and now continue to
keep it there.85 Ultimately, “in the case of state contracts with pri-
vate creditors, . . . there is no evidence of general international law
establishing the sanctity of such contracts.”86 In fact, repudiation of
debt, even in violation of domestic law, must be based “on notions
of justice and equity, and therefore would imply the relevance of
considerations such as the odiousness of the debt.”87
Declaration of debt as odious may not always have the effect of
repudiating it or imposing a moratorium on debt payments; in-
stead, it could constitute grounds for renegotiating or restructur-
ing the debt. For example, in some instances, a “debtor State
[may] invoke concerns of odious debt in negotiations with its cred-
itors in order to reach compromise that promotes financial stability
and future access to credit.”88
IV. DEBT MADE MORE ODIOUS BY COLONIALISM
It is a basic tenet of odious debt doctrine that analysis of debt
repudiation or renegotiation between a state and a private creditor
must consider the overall political context in which the debt initi-
ates.89 If we extend that analysis to include the geopolitical and
macroeconomic factors that give rise to indebted nations, we real-
85 Id. (internal citations omitted). The Restatement makes clear that the tangible
unjustified enrichment of the debtor is key in ascertaining whether the principle
applies.
Restitution is concerned with the receipt of benefits that yield a measur-
able increase in the recipient’s wealth . . . Restitution may strip a wrong-
doer of all profits gained in a transaction with the claimant, but
principles of unjust enrichment will not support the imposition of a lia-
bility that leaves an innocent recipient worse off, apart from costs of
litigation, than if the transaction with the claimant had never taken
place.
Id.
86 Howse, supra note 10, at 6.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 8.
89 Robert K. Rasmussen, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Odious Debt, and the Politics of
Debt Relief, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 252 (2007) (“One does not have to look
hard to see that political concerns often loom large when a country is seeking relief
from its external debt.”). Because debt is only considered odious when stemming
from abuses by a political regime, or, in this case, in part from the political relation-
ship between Puerto Rico and the United States, the nature of the debt cannot be
divorced from the context in which it was contracted.
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ize that they are inherently “a product of the structural and histori-
cal convergence of private economic power and political
strategies.”90 Debt repayment must consider the way that financing,
debt, and investment shape domestic and foreign policy.91 For ex-
ample, debts accumulated to undermine decolonization efforts or
thwart self-determination and human rights of a nation are recog-
nized as wrongful under international law.92 Such debts typically
fall under the category of subjugated debts, or debts incurred by an
oppressor or colonizer over an oppressed people unable to assert
sovereignty.
Following the United States’ refusal to assume Spain’s debt in
Cuba, purportedly to benefit the Cuban economy, scholars began
to draw a “distinction between debts according to their purpose,
ruling out the transfer of debts in connexion [sic] with subjugation
and accepting the transferability only of those that had contributed
to a territory’s development.”93 Despite the clear delineation of
debts accrued by a colonizing nation on behalf of the colonized,
there is far less clarity about the legitimacy of debts accrued by the
colonized nation. Whereas debts accumulated by a colonizing nation
on “behalf” of the colonized are inherently suspicious, debts accu-
mulated by a colony (which remains unable to exercise self-deter-
mination and is subject to the laws and policies of the colonizing
nation) are presumed to be legitimate and lawful.
The colonial status of Puerto Rico both contributes directly to
the economic crisis as well as inhibits comprehensive solutions that
would address short-term concerns and long-term economic policy
changes. The United Nations Special Committee on Decoloniza-
tion issued its annual resolution on the colonial status of Puerto
Rico in early 2015, noting that the island needs to be able to make
decisions in a sovereign manner to address its urgent economic
and social needs, including its twelve percent unemployment rate,
90 Louis A. Pérez, Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman, Public Power and Private Purpose:
Odious Debt and the Political Economy of Hegemony, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 699,
701 (2007).
91 Id.
92 Bedjaoui, supra note 18, at 69. In the context of war debts, “[t]he question of
‘odious debts’ in a case of State succession arises . . . in connexion [sic] on the one
hand with human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and, on the
other hand, with the unlawfulness of recourse to war.” Id. The same holds true for
subjugated debts, which are “debts contracted by a State with a view to attempting to
repress an insurrectionary movement or war of liberation in a territory that it domi-
nates or seeks to dominate, or to strengthen its economic colonization of that terri-
tory.” Id. at 72.
93 Id. at 73.
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marginalization, and the widespread poverty of its residents.94 The
Committee recognized that the economic vulnerability of Puerto
Rico is a direct consequence of its colonial status and that Puerto
Rico’s lack of political power to affect decision-making in the
United States is reflected in the policies and politics that shape and
ultimately cripple the island’s economy.95
The colonial relationship of Puerto Rico to the United States
is relevant to the question of odious debt because Puerto Rico’s
political status is a critical impediment to its ability to negotiate or
renegotiate the debt, to seek foreign investment or financing from
international banking institutions, or to implement economic poli-
cies that would allow it to restructure the debt in the short-term
and build a viable economy for the future.96 In a 2015 amicus brief,
the United States officially acknowledged for the first time since
Puerto Rico’s 1952 constitution was created that it in fact has no
separate sovereignty and cannot pass laws without the approval and
consent of Congress, essentially affirming its colonial status.97 This
colonial relationship is further illustrated in the text of the Puerto
Rican constitution, which contains an unusual clause that requires
that the island pay back general-obligation bonds before virtually
any other government expenditure, perversely prioritizing private
creditors at the expense of public needs.98
Puerto Rico’s political status cannot be divorced from its abil-
ity to make decisions and implement economic policies. The Com-
monwealth must follow federal law and precedent, except in
94 Special Comm. on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Dec-
laration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Deci-
sion of the Special Comm. of 23 June 2014 Concerning Puerto Rico, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.109/2015/L.6 (2015).
95 For a brief explanation of how Puerto Rico’s colonial status impacts its eco-
nomic standing, see Victor Rodriguez, Puerto Rico’s Economic and Fiscal Crisis: Made in
the U.S.A., COUNTERPUNCH (July 3, 2015), http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/07/
03/puerto-ricos-economic-and-fiscal-crisis-made-in-the-u-s-a/ [https://perma.cc/
DLJ7-LLL6].
96 As Howse explains, “[T]he concept of odious debt, rather than a self-standing
legal doctrine, might be regarded as a lex specialis of transitional justice, a form of
justice that is inherently and pervasively political and legal as well as highly contextu-
alized in its specific content.” Howse, supra note 10, at 7.
97 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 19–24,
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 791 (Dec. 23, 2015) (No.
15-108), 2015 WL 9412680.
98  P.R. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (“In case the available revenues including surplus for
any fiscal year are insufficient to meet the appropriations made for that year, interest
on the public debt and amortization thereof shall first be paid, and other disburse-
ments shall thereafter be made in accordance with the order of priorities established
by law.”).
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circumstances where Puerto Rico has been explicitly removed from
protections, such as in the case of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code.99 It must follow orders from the U.S. judiciary, to whom vul-
ture funds have appealed to recoup their money. Nowhere is Pu-
erto Rico’s status as a colony made more evident than by
Congress’s willingness to impose a federal fiscal control board to
administer the island’s finances,100 regardless of the will of the peo-
ple and in defiance of any democratic processes or elections. Es-
sentially, Puerto Rico’s debt is made more odious because of the
lack of viable and dignified options for remedying it, given its in-
ability to engage in meaningful conversations on debt restructur-
ing as a result of its political standing and lack of sovereignty.
Even when it attempts to exercise autonomy, Puerto Rico has
been unsuccessful because the island is ultimately bound by federal
law. In 2014, a federal district court ruled that the quiebra criolla law
passed by the Puerto Rican legislature was unconstitutional.101 The
First Circuit upheld the decision, noting that Puerto Rico cannot
behave like a state in seeking bankruptcy protections that do not
apply to it, and thus circumvent United States federal law.102 Ad-
ministratively, the U.S. Department of the Treasury explicitly re-
jected the idea of a federal “bailout” of Puerto Rico akin to the
kind that taxpayers funded for investment banks in 2008 in the
amount of hundreds of billions of dollars.103
If there are few domestic remedies available, there are even
fewer international ones. Because of its colonial status, Puerto Rico
99 Puerto Rico was originally included in Chapter 9, until Congress amended it in
1984 and removed Puerto Rico, along with other territories and districts, from bank-
ruptcy protection. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-353, § 421(j)(6), 98 Stat. 333, 368-69 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(52)
(2012)).
100 The fiscal control board, or emergency manager, would retain the authority to
make decisions concerning the budget, which implicates critical policy choices, even
as Puerto Ricans may elect new leadership with a different vision for governing the
island or who may prioritize public services over debt repayment. The decision to
force a federal control board on Puerto Rico may be inextricably linked to any federal
legislative reform or financial assistance for Puerto Rico. See The Need for the Establish-
ment of a Puerto Rico Financial Stability and Economic Growth Authority Before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016), http://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/
eventsingle.aspx?EventID=399799 [https://perma.cc/X47G-Z95A].
101 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico, 85 F. Supp. 3d 577, 600–01 (D.P.R.
2015).
102 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 341 (1st Cir. 2015), cert.
granted sub nom Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015).
103 Nick Timiraos, Lew Says No Federal Bailout Being Considered for Puerto Rico, WALL
ST. J. (July 28, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lew-says-no-federal-bailout-being-
considered-for-puerto-rico-1438118543.
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cannot access international financial institutions such as the Devel-
opment Bank, Banco del Sur of MERCOSUR, or even the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, institutions that might offer more favorable
rates and terms for lending to Puerto Rico. The lack of sovereignty
also complicates Puerto Rico’s ability to enter into treaties or com-
mercial agreements. Despite invitations from Venezuelan President
Nicolás Maduro, Puerto Rico has not become a member of the Pe-
trocaribe energy initiative between Venezuela and other Caribbean
states,104 which would allow the island to purchase fuel at a prefer-
ential price and under favorable terms.105 Nor does Puerto Rico
have control over its borders, customs, aerial space, or communica-
tions infrastructure—all areas that could boost the local economy.
Ultimately, resolution of Puerto Rico’s broader economic crisis will
require not only implementation of both short and long-term eco-
nomic policies but a political solution as well.
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
Aside from the more obvious economic consequences of the
crisis on the people of Puerto Rico, the odious nature of the debt
has also resulted in widespread human rights violations, including
the erosion of economic and social rights.106 Austerity measures,
both the ones implemented and the ones advocated for, amount to
economic violence and have resulted in the forced migration of
hundreds of thousands of people, cuts to critical public services
serving marginalized and vulnerable communities, reduced em-
ployment, and threats to remove federal labor protections.107
Forced repayment of the debt in full will only result in increased
privatization of public services, tax breaks for the very few and very
wealthy, and enhanced tax burdens on poor people, creating more
104 Venezuela to Propose Entry of Puerto Rico to Petrocaribe, EL UNIVERSAL (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/140123/venezuela-to-propose-entry-
of-puerto-rico-to-petrocaribe [https://perma.cc/PU5J-HXAZ].
105 Venezuela y PetroCaribe Extienden la Mano a PR, EL NUEVO DIA (June 27, 2014),
http://www.wapa.tv/noticias/locales/venezuela-y-petrocaribe-extienden-la-mano-a-
pr_20131122241662.html [https://perma.cc/8AE5-JUH4].
106 Despite not having ratified the ICESCR, the rights enshrined and the principles
embodied make up customary international law, which the United States is obligated
to consider and abide by when considering its human rights obligations and interpret-
ing its treaty obligations in light of the evolution of customary international law.
ICESCR, supra note 56, arts. 2(2), 12; see also UDHR, supra note 64, art. 3 (represent-
ing the broad spectrum of rights that states are obligated to protect, regardless of
whether they explicitly recognize them).
107 See Request for Thematic Hearing, supra note 20.
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wealth disparity and inequality in an already very unequal
society.108
A. Public Audit of the Debt
In response to those who continue to doubt the odious nature
of Puerto Rico’s debt, many have called for an audit of the debt
and full transparency on what is owed and to whom.109 While the
Puerto Rican legislature approved the creation of an audit commis-
sion, it has not yet been funded or convened to initiate a full public
auditing of how the debt was contracted and what resources were
financed by it. A citizen’s audit, which would include direct partici-
pation by a broad base coalition of civil society groups, could fur-
ther detail the nature of the debt; how it was accumulated; by
whom and under what terms; how the funds received by the gov-
ernment were spent; a thorough risk assessment and what investors
knew of the risk at the time; and what benefit was ultimately
granted to the people as an unpayable debt.110 As long as the peo-
ple of Puerto Rico are being told that the debt is now public, they
should be made aware of what they are obliged to pay for.
B. International Community Response
Invocation of the doctrine of odious debt as a defense to re-
payment does not necessarily in itself relieve all obligation of the
debtor to pay the debt, but it could aid in establishing a restructur-
ing of the debt or other forms of debt relief. Given that Puerto
Rico is constitutionally bound to pay its creditors above public
debt,111 domestic litigation is unlikely to prove successful or useful
in addressing the current economic crisis. In traditional transi-
tional justice contexts, the new regime’s contention of the odious
nature of debt could be raised in bilateral or multilateral negotia-
108 Cernic, supra note 58, at 137–39.
109 In 2015, the Centro para Periodisimo Investigativo (Center for Investigative
Journalism) filed suit against the Governor, requesting that the list of all creditors be
made public, along with their demands of the government in order to entertain any
notion of debt negotiation. See Mandamus Petition, Centro de Periodismo Investiga-
tivo v. Alejandro Garcı́a Padilla, (Court of First Instance, Superior Court of San Juan,
July 13, 2015), http://27bzcmukscr11z1wycuem83o5.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/
files/2015/07/Demanda.pdf. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees
the right of citizens to participate in the government of their countries, which natu-
rally extends to an auditing process of government spending and services. UDHR,
supra note 64, para. 21, 10.
110 Debt Audit Committee Intends to Bring About Transparency to Debt, CARIBBEAN BUS.
(Jan. 20, 2016), http://cb.pr/debt-audit-committee-intends-to-bring-about-trans-
parency-to-debt/ [https://perma.cc/34CF-SCHQ].
111 P.R. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
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tions on debt relief. Since the context for Puerto Rico is unique,
however, the island should seek support from the international
community by asking instead that an independent institution assess
the legitimacy of the debt in order to determine its odiousness.112
Similarly, a specialized body or independent commission consist-
ing of various experts could be created to undertake an assessment
of the debt and devise a relief or restructuring plan113 including
the establishment of an international and independent tribunal
that operates similarly to a bankruptcy court to help restructure
sovereign debts.114 Puerto Rico could even suggest that the govern-
ment engage in arbitration with creditors or advocate for the crea-
tion of a special tribunal, or quasi-tribunal, to adjudicate claims
where Puerto Rico could present equitable defenses.115 The United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the effects of foreign debt and
other related international financial obligations of States on the
full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social,
and cultural rights, has laid out guidelines for establishing a mech-
anism for resolution of debt repayment issues, which should in-
clude the capacity to rule on the odiousness of the debt.116
Regardless of the forum, which could simultaneously include re-
gional and international human rights, any adjudication must con-
sider Puerto Rico’s binding legal obligations to uphold human
rights and to promote a development agenda that protects human
rights.117
VI. CONCLUSION
Odious debt is ultimately an equitable remedy, not a remedy
at law, but it is intended to prevent further injustices and abuses
112 See Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt: When Dictators Borrow,
Who Repays the Loan?, BROOKINGS INST. (Spring 2003), http://www.brookings.edu/re-
search/articles/2003/03/spring-development-kremer [https://perma.cc/ALF7-
Y8E4].
113 ODIOUS LENDING, supra note 71, at 3.
114 Joseph Stiglitz, Odious Rulers, Odious Debts, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2003), http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/11/odious-rulers-odious-debts/
302831/ [https://perma.cc/QB9N-9HXM].
115 DEBT RELIEF AS IF JUSTICE MATTERED, supra note 83, at 2.
116 Lumina, supra note 53, ¶¶ 84–86.
117 Id. ¶ 7 (noting the importance of using human rights forums and tribunals
because most international forums “have thus far failed to deliver an equitable and
lasting solution to the sovereign debt problem in line with the various commitments
made by the international community. In addition, these other forums do not have
explicit mandates to promote and protect human rights and have not factored
human rights into their policies and programmes in line with the internationally ac-
cepted human rights-based approach to development”).
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upon the people of a nation who have suffered at the hands of
unscrupulous officials and creditors. Puerto Rico’s debt is odious,
both because of how it was accumulated and because of the human
rights toll of the price now required to pay it back. Austerity mea-
sures disguised as responsible fiscal policy will only continue to
deepen the economic crisis, including the burgeoning wealth dis-
parities, impoverishment, and resulting massive forced migration
from the island. Ultimately, though, it is the legacy of colonialism
that has created the current economic crisis in the island. The po-
litical status of Puerto Rico must be resolved in order to deal with
its immediate economic needs, access international capital, grow
its economy, create local jobs and sustainable industries, as well as
develop long-term economic policies that will prevent economic
exploitation and future crises. True economic growth and sustaina-
ble development must center human rights and equitable progress,
which can only be made possible through self-determination. Pu-
erto Rico must acquire the capacity to determine, fund, and imple-
ment its own economic priorities separate and apart from the
interests of investors, foreign nations, and the United States. Eco-
nomic independence cannot be divorced from political sover-
eignty. The economic collapse of Puerto Rico is the inevitable
consequence of its political subordination.
To address the debt crisis solely as an issue of debtor-creditor
repayment—where Puerto Rico remains subject to the laws, poli-
cies, and economic interests that allowed or even facilitated its in-
debtedness in the first place—misunderstands the source of the
ongoing bleeding in an open wound that refuses to heal. Presum-
ing a congressional fix, which alters a few laws and imposes a fed-
eral control board under the pretext of “good governance” (but
which actually continues to economically colonize Puerto Rico and
undermine its democratic processes, subjugating it yet again to the
political will of the United States), allows colonialism to remain un-
touched. The international community has declared such a prac-
tice to be immoral and abhorrent.118 Recognizing, however, that
Puerto Rico needs economic and political autonomy to address the
overall economic crisis the country faces names the source of the
bleeding for millions of people and allows the nation to begin to
heal by prioritizing its own needs and funding them.
Debt that burdens generations of people without an end in
sight is indeed odious, as is colonialism. The people of Puerto Rico
118 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960).
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should not be required to pay the price of their own demise in
order to enhance the profits of a few. Justice requires that their
debt be deemed odious.

